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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you own a house and some land adjacent to where a new
supermarket is being built. You and your neighbors are excited about
the proximity and convenience the new market will provide. The
supermarket, on the other hand, is less excited about the existence of
your house because it interferes with its ability to create additional
parking spaces. The supermarket may negotiate with you to buy your
property; but if you decline to sell, the supermarket will need to work
around your property and have fewer parking spaces. It may need to
sweeten its offer to make it more attractive to you.
Scenarios like this happen every day, and for the most part, rarely
give us pause.1 After all, the supermarket knew your house was there
before it moved into the neighborhood. The need for the supermarket
to negotiate with you (or settle for a smaller parking lot) would not have
* Austin E. Owen Research Scholar & Professor of Law, University of Richmond School
of Law.
1 For examples of this battle between developers and homeowners, see Stefanos
Chen, New Development Returns, Along with New Holdouts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/10/realestate/holdout-new-development.html.
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caught it off-guard. Even if you were driving a hard bargain for the land,
the supermarket should not have been surprised—after all, it is your
home.2
Consider now a twist to this scenario. When you decline the
supermarket’s offer to purchase your land, the supermarket decides to
put parking spaces on it anyway. If the supermarket knew that a court
would side with it and, at worst, make it pay for its use of your land, it
may even seem like a reasonable business decision. After all, the money
it will bring in via these extra parking spaces (and thus customers) can
easily cover whatever a court may determine is owed to you. In this
case, you would be outraged. Your anger would be exponentially
greater if you knew that the supermarket never even tried to negotiate
with you. Anticipating a favorable outcome with the courts, the
supermarket decided to pave over your yard and seek to compensate
you later, if at all.
Now imagine, instead of a house and land, you have a patent on an
innovative technology. Many people are excited about the possibilities
this new technology brings, but at least one company is less excited
about the existence of your patent. It could interfere with this
company’s ability to manufacture and market a product it hoped to add.
In many cases like this, the company may try to purchase your patent or
negotiate a license to use the technology covered by the patent. If you
decline, the company may need to design around your technology or, if
it is critical to the company’s new product, perhaps sweeten its offer to
seal a deal.
Scenarios like this happen every day and, just like the real property
example above, rarely give us pause. Patents are sold, licensed, and
cross-licensed regularly.3 In fact, the ease of transacting is one of the
features of the patent system.4 Patents are published documents and, at
least since 2000, most applications for United States patents are
published eighteen months after filing.5 Companies are often well aware
of others’ patents when working in a particular technology space.
Similarly, given that patents are provided to give inventors a period of
2 D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 255
(2006) (“As our cultural cliché ‘a house is not a home’ suggests, ‘home’ means far more
than a physical structure. ‘Home’ evokes thoughts of, among other things, family, safety,
privacy, and community.”).
3 See Anne Kelley, Practicing in the Patent Market Place, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 115–
16 (2011).
4 See Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO STATE L.J. 473,
476 (2005).
5 American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 4502(a), 113
Stat. 1501A-561 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 122).
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exclusivity in which they may recoup some of their research and
development investments,6 it is not surprising that patent owners may
drive a hard bargain to allow others to use their patents.
The same twist described above with a home can also happen with
patents. If you decline to sell or license your patented technology to a
company, that company may simply decide to use your technology
anyway. If the company knows that a court will likely side with it and,
at worst, make it pay for its use of your patent, it may seem like a rational
business decision. Either pay now or pay later, it is all the same to the
company. In fact, if it can pay later, the company effectively obtained an
interest-free loan.7 If the company was fairly certain that the worst
outcome would be paying the patentee for past and ongoing
infringement, perhaps that company should forgo the initial step of
negotiating in the first place.8 Given the clear parallels to the house and
supermarket case, you would expect to be outraged by the behavior of
this company. However, it turns out that is not always the case.
While the supermarket example may seem far-fetched, especially
where the supermarket does not seek permission before paving, the
scenario in patent law is common enough—and acceptable enough—to
have its own name: “efficient” infringement.9 In general, it happens in
certain cases, where either the patent owner or the type of patent has
been identified in some ways as problematic. These problems, however,
used to justify the propriety of “efficient” infringement are, in many
cases, simply not true. Moreover, the term “efficient” infringement
connotes a certain analysis of costs and benefits that is also incorrect.
This Article explains why the rationalizations for “efficient”
6 Katherine J. Strandberg, Users as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79
U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 472 (2008).
7 Adam Mossoff, Institutional Design in Patent Law: Private Property Rights or
Regulatory Entitlements, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 921, 939 (2019) (explaining the choice when
the infringer “economically gains from deliberately infringing on a patent because it
knows the patent owner will not receive an injunction”) (internal quotations omitted).
8 In fact, the infringer may even end up in a better position, paying less than it would
have been able to negotiate. See id. at 943 (describing when “companies do not pursue
a license and instead infringe a patent given their economic calculation that a denial of
an injunction and a below-market-rate ‘reasonable royalty’ awarded by a court will
result in a smaller compulsory license fee than if they negotiated a license directly with
the patent owner”).
9 The term “efficient” infringement seems to date back to a law review comment
written by Julie S. Turner in 1998. See Julie S. Turner, Comment, The Nonmanufacturing
Patent Owner: Toward a Theory of Efficient Infringement, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 179, 179 (1998)
(proposing the use of liability rules where the patent owner is not practicing the patent).
But imposing liability-type rules for patent infringement was not practical until after the
Supreme Court’s decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC. See infra Section II.B.
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infringement should not be accepted and further, whether the
purported reasons are valid or not, why “efficient” infringement must
be stopped.
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part II will explain
“efficient” infringement in greater detail, including why the concept has
gained greater traction in the last couple of decades. Specifically, the
Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC10 led
to uncertain grants of injunctive relief in some cases that gave rise to the
circumstances in which “efficient” infringement can flourish. Part III
will describe both the particular patent owner and type of patent that
have been deemed problematic, such that “efficient” infringement has
become a viable, and supposedly rational, course of action. Companies
that do not manufacture things but instead license their patents and
patents that cover inventions that have been incorporated into
technology standards have often failed the test for injunctive relief set
forth in eBay. Moreover, there are several other justifications
concerning these patent owners and types of patents that are also used
to sanction “efficient” infringement. Part IV will demonstrate that these
alleged problems, which are used to defend certain types of patent
infringement, are not actually true. This Part will also show that,
regardless of whether these patent owners or specific type of patents
are problematic, the notion of “efficient” infringement is a misnomer
that glosses over what should be viewed as troubling behavior.
II. WHAT IS “EFFICIENT” INFRINGEMENT AND WHY IS IT A THING?
“[B]ig companies can now largely ignore legitimate patent holders.
Of course, they don’t call it stealing. . . . [A] new phrase has emerged in
Silicon Valley: ‘efficient infringing.’”11
A patent provides its owner with property rights—and, in fact, the
only right that is associated with a patent is the right to exclude, or keep
others from using the subject matter that is patented.12 The right to

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 389, 391 (2006).
Joe Nocera, Opinion, The Patent Troll Smokescreen, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/24/opinion/the-patent-troll-smokescreen.html.
12 35 U.S.C. § 261 (“[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal property.”); 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (“Every patent shall contain . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or
assigns, of the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the United States
. . .” (emphasis added)); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The essence of
10
11
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exclude is usually associated with the ability to obtain injunctive relief
against a trespasser or infringer.13 “Efficient” infringement, or choosing
to infringe another’s patent instead of negotiating and accepting a
license first, is only a rational course of action when the infringer will
not later be enjoined from using the patented technology. These next
Sections first explain injunctive relief and its historical place in patent
law, before briefly discussing how the 2006 Supreme Court decision in
eBay changed the analysis when deciding whether it may be lucrative to
infringe.
A. Injunctive Relief and “Efficient” Infringement
Injunctive relief springs from the rights associated with the grant
of a patent. The Constitution grants authors and inventors an “exclusive
[r]ight” in their writings and discoveries.14 The Patent Act of 1790 gave
inventors “the sole and exclusive right and liberty of making,
constructing, using and vending to others,”15 and in 1819, Congress
expressly authorized injunctive relief for patent infringement.16 The
modern Patent Act provides that courts “may grant injunctions in
accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any
right secured by patent.”17 The Supreme Court has recognized “the
essence of a patent grant is the right to exclude . . . .”18 The Federal
Circuit, which hears patent appeals, similarly noted that “the right to
exclude recognized in a patent is . . . the essence of the concept of
property.”19
Injunctions, then, are an important type of equitable remedy,
issued by a court and requiring the enjoined party to refrain from a
particular act or acts (or alternatively to perform certain acts).20 If the
all property is the right to exclude, and the patent property right is certainly not
inconsequential.”).
13 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property,
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 598 (2008) (“For
quite some time, the right to exclude in the context of both tangible and intangible
property has come to be associated with an entitlement to exclusionary (injunctive)
relief.”).
14 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
15 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790).
16 An Act to Extend the Jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of the United States to Cases
Arising Under the Law Relating to Patents, ch. 19, 3 Stat. 481, 481 (1819).
17 35 U.S.C. § 283.
18 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 448 U.S. 176, 215 (1980).
19 Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
20 Injunction, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/injunction (last
visited Jan. 30, 2021).

OSENGA (DO NOT DELETE)

1090

4/7/22 4:24 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:1085

enjoined party fails to refrain from the prohibited act, a court may hold
that party in contempt.21 In the patent context, continued infringement
is typically enjoined.22 Although the scope and language of injunctive
relief in patent cases can range from simply “do not infringe” to “obey
the law” and from very broad to very tailored language, the practical
result of injunctive relief is the reinstatement of the exclusive right
associated with the grant of a patent.23
Previously, patent infringement cases had a fairly reliable rhythm.
A patent owner would sue an accused infringer, and a court—whether
it be the judge or the jury—would determine whether the patent is
infringed.24 Additionally, the accused infringer would often assert that
the patent was invalid and this too would be determined.25 If the patent
in question was found both not invalid and infringed, the court would
award damages for past infringement and, in nearly all cases, grant a
permanent injunction.26 The issuance of a permanent injunction would
serve as a strong deterrent to infringement. After all, it is very expensive
to embark on a course of manufacturing and distributing a product that
a court may later enjoin.
This predictable system had, built within it, a set of beneficial
outcomes. First, an accused infringer who feared a possible future court
order enjoining its behavior would often engage in pre-infringement
negotiations in an attempt to license the technology before embarking
on potentially infringing behavior.27 Second, if the accused infringer did
not obtain a license ahead of time, when facing a lawsuit in which
injunctive relief is the likely outcome if infringement is found, the
accused infringer and the patent owner may be more likely to engage in

Id.
Karen E. Sandrik, Reframing Patent Remedies, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV. 95, 102–03
(2012).
23 John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) than “Off Switches”: PatentInfringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1403–04 (2012).
24 Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 41, 52 (2012);
Jason Rantanen, Empirical Analyses of Judicial Opinions: Methodology, Metrics & the
Federal Circuit, 49 CONN. L. REV. 227, 256 (2016).
25 Shawn P. Miller, What’s the Connection Between Repeat Litigation and Patent
Quality? A (Partial) Defense of the Most Litigated Patents, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 313, 316
(2013) (noting success in litigation where patents are found not invalid and infringed).
26 See Balganesh, supra note 13, at 650–51 (discussing the Federal Circuit’s rule of
nearly automatically granting injunctive relief); Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley,
Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 16 fig. 3 (2012)
(illustrating a grant rate of greater than 90 percent for the period before the eBay
decision).
27 See cf. Sandrik, supra note 22, at 98.
21
22
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pre-lawsuit (or at least pre-decision) settlement negotiations.28 Finally,
even if the lawsuit drew to a conclusion, these regularly-granted
injunctions would serve as a place from which post-lawsuit negotiations
would begin.
If injunctive relief is not routinely granted, however, these benefits
disappear. Instead, it makes much more sense for a potential infringer
to infringe now—and pay later. At worst, if an injunction is not granted
following a patent infringement trial, the infringer will simply have to
pay damages for past infringement and an ongoing royalty for
continued, future infringement.29 This result is akin to having taken a
license to start with, but with the bonus of an interest-free loan for the
period of infringement prior to and during the trial period.30 Moreover,
the infringer could actually end up in a better position. The patent
owner may never bring suit, meaning that the infringer pays no
royalties, or the patent owner could prevail, but the royalty rate
determined by the court for past and ongoing infringement could be
substantially lower than the rate that the patent owner was offering at
the outset, saving the infringer money.31
B. The Disappearance of Injunctive Relief
As described above, for “efficient” infringement to be an attractive
course of action, there must be a realistic probability that a court will
not award a patent owner injunctive relief upon the finding of a valid
patent and infringement by the accused. The onset of the current wave
of “infringe now, pay later,” traces to the 2006 Supreme Court case of
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC,32 which altered the landscape of nearcertain grants of injunctive relief in patent cases.
28 John M. Golden, Litigation in the Middle: The Context of Patent Infringement
Injunctions, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2078–79 (2014) (explaining how injunctive relief
affects the expected gains and losses from litigation and may alter settlement decisions).
29 Nocera, supra note 11 (“Because the courts have largely robbed small inventors
of their ability to seek an injunction . . . the worst that can happen is that the infringer
will have to pay some money.”).
30 Damages are not awarded until the completion of a trial. Thus, any infringement
that occurs prior to and during the trial will occur before any payments are made by the
infringer. Infringing without paying until years after the behavior is akin to an interestfree loan. This period includes any time of infringement before trial and up to three
years during trial before damages are awarded. See Derek Freitas, 2020 Patent
Litigation: Year in Review, JDSUPRA (Mar. 25, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/
legalnews/2020-patent-litigation-year-in-review-5104923/ (showing a period of over
1.5 up to nearly 3 years from filing date to trial date for new patent cases in several
popular districts).
31 See Mossoff, supra note 7, at 938.
32 See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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The patent in the eBay case was held by MercExchange, a company
that did not itself make use of the patent.33 Instead, as a failed start-up,
MercExchange licensed the patented technology to others.34 The district
court found that the patent was not invalid and was infringed by eBay
and, therefore, granted MercExchange substantial damages.35 The
district court declined MercExchange’s request for a permanent
injunction based on that company’s willingness to license the patent.36
MercExchange appealed to the Federal Circuit, which affirmed the
district court’s finding of not invalid and infringed, but reversed the
denial of permanent injunction based on its general rule that permanent
injunctions should be issued upon a finding of patent infringement.37
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously reversed
the Federal Circuit.38 In doing so, the Court announced a four-factor test
that courts should use when deciding whether to grant a permanent
injunction.39 The four-factor test requires the party seeking a
permanent injunction to demonstrate “(1) that it has suffered an
irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that,
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public
interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”40 These
factors are balanced and considered on the merits of each particular
case.41 The Supreme Court took issue with both the district court’s
denial of injunctive relief and the Federal Circuit’s reversal/grant of
injunctive relief, noting that both categorical grants or denials are
inapposite for this equitable doctrine.42
Despite the opinion’s rather straightforward command against
categorical relief or lack thereof, the eBay opinion spawned two
concurring opinions. One concurrence, authored by Chief Justice
Roberts and joined by Justices Scalia and Ginsburg, noted that, although
automatic grants of injunctive relief for patent infringement were
33 See Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case Studies of Patent Assertion
Entities, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 23–28 (2014) (providing the history of MercExchange).
34 See id. at 27–28.
35 MercExchange, LLC v. eBay Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 698–99 (E.D. Va. 2003).
36 Id. at 712, 722.
37 MercExchange, LLC v. eBay Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1338–1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
38 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 389, 391 (2006).
39 Id. at 391.
40 Id. at 391.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 393–94.
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inappropriate, there were very clear and valid reasons that injunctions
should still be predictably granted in most cases.43 The other
concurrence, written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer, laid out what may be best characterized as the three
bogeymen of patent law: patent trolls, small components of big devices,
and business method patents.44 When one or more of these issues are
present in a case, a court should be wary about granting injunctive
relief.45
Interestingly, the four-factor test from eBay has become “the test”
for whether injunctive relief should be granted, regardless of the type of
case involved; in fact, the test has appeared in decisions in other areas
of intellectual property, government regulations, constitutional law, and
even state tort and contract law cases.46 As one set of commentators
remarked: “For an opinion that claims merely to apply generally
acknowledged principles, eBay has become a remarkable legal
juggernaut.”47
While the reach of the eBay factors may be surprising, the effect it
has had on patent law remedies is less shocking. Predictable grants of
injunctions for patent infringement were standard until 2006, when the
Supreme Court’s eBay opinion created a major shift.48 Studies of
injunction grants prior to eBay found that injunctive relief was granted
in the vast majority of cases where courts found patent infringement.49
Studies done in the first decade after eBay found that requests for a
permanent injunction were granted in approximately three-quarters of
the cases where patent infringement was found (and an injunction was
requested). A widely-cited study conducted by Professor Christopher
Seaman following eBay found that requests for a permanent injunction

43 Id. at 394–95 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (noting that injunctions should continue
to issue in the “vast majority of patent cases,” as the right to exclude is difficult to capture
via monetary damages).
44 See id. at 395–97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
45 See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46 Mark P. Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme Court’s Accidental
Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 205 (2012).
47 Id. at 206.
48 See MercExchange LLC v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing
a “general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions against patent
infringement” absent a good reason, such as a public health concern, to deny it); see also
W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
49 Ryan T. Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange and Why: An
Analysis of the Case History, Precedent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 677, 719 (2015).
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were granted in 72.5 percent of cases.50 Similar numbers were shown
in studies by Professors Colleen Chien and Mark Lemley (approximately
75 percent in the five years following eBay) and Professor Jay Kesan and
Kirti Gupta (80.7 percent between June 2006 and December 2012).51
The change from near-guaranteed injunctive relief to injunctions in
75–80 percent of cases where patent infringement is found does make
“efficient” infringement more attractive. Because injunctions are not
granted in only a quarter of the cases, there is still a substantial risk in
the “infringe now, pay later” strategy. If the odds of this gamble could
be made even more favorable, the analysis in choosing this route would
change dramatically. Fortunately (for infringers, at least), there are
certain types of patent owners and certain types of patents that are even
less likely to receive injunctive relief—heightening the odds that
“efficient” infringement will pay off.
III. WHEN IS “EFFICIENT” INFRINGEMENT HAPPENING?
There are two primary circumstances that account for the portion
of cases where injunctive relief is routinely unavailable despite a finding
of patent infringement. The first is when the patent owner is a “patent
troll,” as was at issue in the eBay case. Patent trolls are companies that
“don’t make anything,” but instead license their patented technology to
others.52 The second instance is in the case of standard-essential
patents (“SEPs”), or patents that cover technology incorporated in a
technology standard such as Wi-Fi or 4G LTE.53 This Section will discuss
each of these circumstances, in turn, as well as explain why these two
circumstances are most likely to fail to satisfy the eBay factors.

50 Christopher B. Seaman, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Litigation After eBay: An
Empirical Study, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1949, 1983, 1988 (2016).
51 Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2012); Kirti Gupta & Jay P. Kesan, Studying the Impact of eBay
on Injunctive Relief in Patent Cases 15, fig. 3, (July 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629399.
52 Colleen V. Chien, Turn the Tables on Patent Trolls, FORBES (Aug. 9, 2011, 11:37 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2011/08/09/turn-the-tables-on-patenttrolls/. In addition to stating that “trolls don’t make anything,” she also focuses on their
allegedly litigious nature. See id.
53 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, A Simple Approach to Setting Reasonable
Royalties for Standard-Essential Patents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1135, 1136 (2013)
(“Patents covering technology necessary to comply with a standard are ‘standardessential patents.”).
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A. Patent Trolls
A “patent troll” is a company that uses, to some extent, a licensing
business model.54 Despite the typical accusation that “patent trolls”
“don’t make anything,”55 the term has been applied to a wide variety of
firms that have a diversity of actual business models—some of which
even make things. Although there are various conflicting definitions
about what precise type of firm qualifies as a “patent troll,” the primary
point of agreement is that a substantial portion of the firm’s income
derives from licensing patents.56 The term “patent troll” is obviously
pejorative and is used to justify accusing these licensing firms of
harming innovation or the economy.57 This Author personally prefers
“patent licensing firm,”58 but for the sake of this Article—where the
mainstream pejorative view of these firms is relevant—the term “patent
troll” will be used.
“Patent trolls” have adopted a business model where they obtain
licenses from those companies who wish to use their technology via
direct negotiation and, when that fails, via patent infringement
lawsuits.59 Although numerous commentators claim that the licensing
business model creates negative impacts, there are positive aspects
associated
with
licensing
business,
including
facilitating
commercialization by better-equipped firms and expanding the market
for patents.60 Despite these beneficial traits, as seen in eBay, other court
decisions, the media, and elsewhere, many clearly have a negative view
of patent trolls primarily because they do not make anything.61 Further,
this bogeyman of the patent troll is often combined with another
problem as set forth by Justice Kennedy—the business method patent.62
54 Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing the “Patent Troll”
Rhetoric, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435, 441 (2014).
55 See supra note 52.
56 See id. at 443–44.
57 See id. at 442.
58 For the Author’s viewpoint generally on “patent trolls” versus “patent licensing
firms,” see generally Kristen Osenga, Sticks & Stones: How the FTC’s Name-Calling Misses
the Complexity of Licensing-Based Business Models, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1001 (2015).
59 See Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities, supra note 54, at 445.
60 See id. at 449–451.
61 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (“An industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for
producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”)
(emphasis added).
62 See id. at 397; 157 Cong. Rec. H4480 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep.
Grimm) (“Infamous ‘patent trolls’ . . . have made business-method patents their specialty
in recent years.”).
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These adverse views, as well as a superficial application of the eBay
factors, are why “patent trolls” routinely are denied injunctive relief and
are thus subject to “efficient” infringement by others.
The reason that patent trolls are generally considered to fail the
eBay-factor test is that, because their business model relies on licensing
of the patent, the courts believe there is no irreparable harm caused by
infringement and that money damages will make the patent troll
whole.63 Moreover, because the patent troll is not making anything, the
public’s interest is in the infringer, who is actually putting products on
the market.64 This distrust of companies that are not making anything
echoes the concerns from Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay. This
disdain, however, for companies that hold patents, but do not make
things, is interesting given Supreme Court precedent from the early
1900s. In the Continental Paper Bag case in 1908, the Court directly
spoke to patent holder non-use, stating that “nonuse is no efficient
reason for withholding injunction[,]” if the nonuse did not offend public
policy.65 The Supreme Court has cited Continental Paper Bag on at least
six subsequent occasions for the proposition that a patentee need not be
practicing the patent to obtain injunctive relief.66 And yet, after eBay,
patent trolls—that is, patent owners who “do not make anything”—are
precisely the type of patentee that is not able to obtain injunctions.
Although eBay stated that there should be no categorical grants or
denials of injunctive relief, at least in the area of patent licensing firms,
there is a growing body of case law that suggests that injunctions are
presumptively denied in cases where the patent holder is not practicing
the technology covered by the patent.67 In the study conducted by
Professor Seaman, discussed above, requests for injunction were
granted only 16 percent of the time where the patent holder was not
practicing the patent.68 Similar low grant rates were seen in the studies
by Chien and Lemley, as well as Kesan and Gupta.69

Seaman, supra note 50, at 1987–90.
James Boyle, Open Source Innovation, Patent Injunctions, and the Public Interest,
11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 30, 57 (2012) (“If the public is being denied access to the
technology altogether during the injunction . . . the public interest will frequently lean
strongly against an injunction.”).
65 Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
66 Ryan T. Holte, Clarity in Remedies for Patent Cases, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 127, 154
n.171 (2018) (citing these cases).
67 Seaman, supra note 50, at 1953.
68 Id. at 1983, fig. 1; 1988, fig. 3.
69 Chien & Lemley, supra note 51, at 9–10; Gupta & Kesan, supra note 51.
63
64
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An exemplary case where a so-called “patent troll” was denied
injunctive relief based on the eBay factors is Soverain Software v.
Newegg, Inc.70 Soverain Software sought a permanent injunction after
the court found Newegg infringing two of Soverain’s patents.71 Although
Soverain argued that its licensing program would be irreparably
harmed if an injunction did not issue and that money damages would be
inadequate to remedy the harm to its licensing program, the district
court was not persuaded.72 The court deemed these claims to be
speculative, focusing instead on Soverain’s extensive licensing and the
relatively small portion of Newegg’s product that Soverain’s technology
represented.73 In a rather circular argument, the court found that the
balance of the hardships favored Newegg because money damages
would make Soverain whole and that the public interest would be
harmed by granting an injunction where Soverain would be adequately
remedied with money.74
Of course, as found in the studies above, the very low percentage of
grants is not zero, and so some patent licensing firms are able to get
injunctive relief. Professor Seaman’s study found that courts were more
inclined to grant injunctive relief to patent holders that were “failing or
failed operating companies that had previously sought to
commercialize” their technology.75 Another example shows that patent
licensing firms that are particularly “appealing” can obtain injunctive
relief. In CSIRO v. Buffalo Technologies, a permanent injunction was
granted to the plaintiff.76 CSIRO, however, was not just any patent
licensing firm, but the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research
Organization, the principal research institution of the Australian
government.77 Because of this status, the district court found that CSIRO
would suffer irreparable harm, absent an injunction, due to losses of
reputation and opportunity.78 Justice Kennedy had already granted the
potential for special plaintiffs in the eBay case, noting “some patent
70 This Author has previously written about Soverain Software in a study of
formerly-manufacturing companies that pivoted to licensing business models (and had
been deemed, by others, to be “patent trolls”). See Osenga, supra note 54, at 458–60.
71 Soverain Software LLC v. Newegg, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 462, 480 (E.D. Tex. 2010).
72 Id. at 481–82.
73 Id. at 482. The court did, however, find that the patented technology was
“necessary” to Newegg’s system. Id.
74 Id.
75 Seaman, supra note 50, at 1989.
76 CSIRO v. Buffalo Tech. Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 607–08 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
77 Id. at 601.
78 Id. at 604.
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holders, such as university researchers or self-made inventors, might
reasonably prefer to license their patents” but could still satisfy the fourfactor test.79
Bound up with the unfavorable application of the eBay factors in
denying injunctive relief to patent trolls, there are also other purported
characteristics of these types of patent owners that discourage courts
from granting these requests. Without a doubt, patent trolls have gotten
a bad reputation in the media and elsewhere; their very moniker evokes
the type of behaviors that many assume these patent owners engage in.
They hide under bridges, waiting to catch good manufacturing
companies unaware.80 They buy up and then wield “bad” patents like
swords and are only in it for the money.81 Of course, when considering
an equitable remedy, these patent owners are at a disadvantage—courts
do not like patent trolls, and the public certainly has no interest in
making them happy.
B. Standard Essential Patents
The other instance where injunctive relief is considered largely
unavailable is less about the patent owner and more about the status of
the patent as a standard essential patent. SEPs cover technology that is
incorporated into a technology standard, such as Wi-Fi or 4G. In theory,
use of these SEPs is necessary for producing a standards-compliant
product or service.82 Some SEPs cover optional features or certain
implementations of a standard.83
Technology standards today are often set by standard
development organizations (“SDOs,” also known as standard setting

eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants,
99 GEO. L.J. 677, 683 (2011) (accusing patent trolls of “hiding under a bridge” and
“demanding a toll from surprised passers-by”).
81 Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A Comment
Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 FED. CIR. BUS. J. 165, 178 (2007)
(defining bad-faith patent trolls as (1) hiding patent ownership until a company
“unsuspectingly infringes it”; (2) acquiring large patent portfolios simply to use
offensively; and (3) intentionally obtaining and asserting “low quality patents”). On the
other hand, some scholars disagree: “We are not aware of any evidence that patent trolls
are more likely to have or assert bad patents than practicing entities.” Matthew Sag &
Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 8 (2007).
82 Richard H. Stern, Who Should Own the Benefits of Standardization and the Value It
Creates?, 19 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 107, 109 n.3 (2018).
83 Id.
79
80
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organizations or “SSOs”).84 Participants in SDOs often own patents that
cover one or more aspects of the standards being developed—that is,
SEPs. SDOs have intellectual property rights, or IPR, policies that (a)
often require SDO participants to disclose patents and patent
applications they hold that they consider to be essential to the standard
while the standard is being developed, deeming them SEPs; and (b)
often require owners of SEPs to agree to license these patents on fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) terms to anyone who
would like to incorporate the standardized technology into their own
products or services.85 The purpose of the FRAND commitment is to
facilitate adoption of the standard by implementers while still providing
reasonable rewards to companies who invested in the research,
development, and standardization process.86
The reason that these patents fail the eBay factor test is because the
patent owner is obligated to license the patent on fair, reasonable, and
non-discriminatory terms. Specifically, if a patent owner agreed to
license the patent on FRAND terms, there is unlikely to be an irreparable
injury, and money damages will certainly make the patentee whole, thus
failing the first two prongs of the eBay test. Because of the FRAND
commitment, where the SEP owner agreed to license the patent on fair,
reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms to any party, injunctive relief
is generally denied because the SEP owner “is, by definition, willing to
license rather than exclude, and benefits from the widespread adoption
of its technology resulting from standardization.”87
Unlike patent licensing firms, where there are some “special”
plaintiffs that can still obtain permanent injunctions even under the
eBay factors,88 patent owners alleging infringement of SEPs are almost
universally shut out of this remedy—at least in the United States.
Beyond FRAND, some SDO policies—both external and internal to
SDOs—discourage or even prohibit the seeking of injunctive relief for
infringement of patents subject to FRAND commitments.89 There are
Kristen Osenga, Ignorance over Innovation: Why Misunderstanding Standard
Setting Organizations Will Hinder Technological Progress, 56 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 159,
164–65 (2018).
85 Id. at 183–87.
86 Id.
87 Thomas F. Cotter, Reflections on Holdup and Royalty Stacking, Part 1, COMPAR. PAT.
REMEDIES (June 11, 2014, 4:20 AM), http://comparativepatentremedies.blogspot.com/
2014/06/reflections-on-holdup-and-royalty.html.
88 See supra notes 75–79.
89 Dirk Auer & Julian Morris, Governing the Patent Commons, 38 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 291, 339–40 (2020) (discussing the effects of the 2015 amendment to the IEEE IPR
policy on injunctive relief).
84
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other externalities that have made getting an injunction for
infringement of an SEP difficult. For example, in 2013, the U.S.
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”) issued a policy statement that suggested strongly that
injunctive relief was generally inappropriate in patent infringement
cases involving SEPs.90 More recently, in an executive order from July
2021, President Biden asked the Attorney General and the Secretary of
Commerce to consider what remedies would be available for SEPs;91
seemingly reversing a 2019 Policy Statement issued jointly by the DOJ,
the USPTO, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(“NIST”) that allowed for injunctive relief in cases of SEP infringement.92
Few courts have had the opportunity to consider whether to grant
injunctive relief for infringement of SEPs, as many SEP owners do not
seek injunctive relief for the reasons noted above. In Microsoft Corp. v.
Motorola, Inc., however, Judge James Robart determined that Motorola’s
FRAND commitment illustrated that there was not irreparable harm and
that money damages were adequate, thus deciding that Motorola would
not be entitled to injunctive relief.93 Beyond the first two eBay factors,
commentators have argued that the balance of the hardships and the
public interest also weigh in favor of denying injunctions for
infringement of SEPs, because the infringer needs access to the
technology to produce and market its standards-compliant products.94
“[W]hile eBay counsels against the use of ‘broad classifications’ and
‘categorical’ rules for or against the entry of injunctive relief, one might
safely conclude that the application of the eBay factors in the typical case
involving an SEP generally would militate against the use of permanent
injunctions.”95

90 U.S. Dep’t of Just. & U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Policy Statement on Remedies for
Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary F/RAND Commitments (Jan. 8, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/1118381/download.
91 Exec. Order No. 14,036, 86 Fed. Reg. 36,987 (July 9, 2021).
92 U.S. Dep’t of Just., U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off. & Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech.,
Policy Statement on Remedies for Standards-Essential Patents Subject to Voluntary
F/RAND Commitments (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/atr/page/file/
1228016/download. This policy statement replaced the 2013 policy statement. See
supra note 90.
93 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2012 WL 5993202, at *6–7
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 30, 2012). Judge Richard Posner, sitting as a trial judge by designation,
arrived at the same conclusion in Apple Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F.Supp.2d 901, 913–
15 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
94 Thomas F. Cotter, Comparative Law and Economics of Standard-Essential Patents
and FRAND Royalties, 22 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 311, 320–21 (2014).
95 Id. (internal citations omitted).
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Additionally, SEPs often cover a smaller component of a much
larger standard or product; this is the second bogeyman of Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence. Although eBay did not speak directly to SEPs,
again Justice Kennedy’s concurrence has been prescient in cutting off
injunctive relief for SEPs. Specifically, Justice Kennedy warned against
granting injunctions against whole devices for infringement of patents
that simply cover small component parts thereof:
When the patented invention is but a small component of the
product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an
injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not
serve the public interest.96
Because the number of SEPs implicated for any particular standard can
number in the hundreds, or even thousands,97 infringement of one or a
few of these SEPs could lead to Justice Kennedy’s concern.
Analogous to the popular narratives we hear about patent trolls
hiding under bridges, tales about badly behaving SEP owners abound.
Specifically, the assertion is that companies who own SEPs seek
unreasonably high licensing rates from companies who wish to make
standards-compliant products using the threat of injunctive relief as a
hammer to make the implementing companies accept these exorbitant
royalty rates.98 This phenomenon, which allegedly is prevalent, is
known as patent holdup and is yet another reason, along with the eBay
factors, that courts are unlikely to grant injunctions upon a finding that
an SEP has been infringed.99
IV. THE LIES WE HEAR ABOUT “EFFICIENT” INFRINGEMENT
“Efficient” infringement is a misnomer—the behavior, while
certainly infringement, is not efficient in the usual senses of that term.
In any case, the determinations that patent trolls and SEP owners are
nearly categorically not eligible for injunctive relief are superficial at
96 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
97 For one example of the quantity of SEPs declared for a particular standard, see
Tim Pohlmann, Who Is Leading the 5G Patent Race for Edge Computing?, MANAGING IP
(May 26, 2021), https://www.managingip.com/article/b1rznbcc4dsk23/who-isleading-the-5g-patent-race-for-edge-computing.
98 Jorge L. Contreras, Much Ado About Hold-up, 2019 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 877 (2019).
99 See J. Gregory Sidak, Is Patent Holdup a Hoax, 3 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 401, 476
(2018) (Sidak found approximately 140 cases between 2007–2018 involving SEPs
where the court mentions “patent holdup” in its analysis.).
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best. Moreover, the narratives used to support the denial of injunctions
are misunderstandings or, perhaps at worst, outright lies. The following
Sections will describe why “efficient” infringement should be called
“predatory” infringement and why patent trolls and SEP owners should
not be generally excluded from obtaining injunctive relief in most cases.
A. Predatory Infringement
While this type of infringement—that is, infringing in the face of a
low likelihood of being enjoined—is known as “efficient” infringement,
it is not efficient in the economic sense of the word. As the head of Global
IP for IBM, William LaFontaine, stated: “Efficient infringement is an
attempt to make infringement seem appropriate. Let me be clear—it is
not.”100 Some commentators have likened “efficient” infringement to
efficient breach in contract law.101 But other scholars have noted that
both efficient breach and “efficient” infringement are, at best, theoretical
ideas.102 In the model of efficient breach, there is an overall net gain in
social welfare based on a willful breach of a contract because the
breaching party takes advantage of an opportunity to obtain a higher
payment that exceeds any damages the breach causes, pays off the party
to the original contract any lost profits the breach causes, and keeps the
extra.103 Both parties, and society, are at least as well off as they would
have been if there had been no breach.104 But this idealized scenario
rarely plays out as such in the real world, as losses often exceed lost
profits, courts may award additional damages, and society loses out on
its ability to confidently trust in contractual commitments.105
Similarly, “efficient” infringement does not result in an overall net
gain in social welfare. The costs to the patent owner are rarely captured
in the reasonable royalties a court imposes. Worse, though, society loses

100 Richard Lloyd, “Patent Sales Are Now an Integral Part of Our Innovation Cycle,” says
IBM’s Global IP Head, IAM (Oct. 26, 2020), https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/
ibm-global-ip-head-the-fallacy-of-efficient-infringement-and-more.
101 James Young Hurt, Comment, Reasonable Royalty for Patent Infringement of NonDirect Revenue Producing Products, 56 IDEA 211, 227 (2016); Ted Sichelman, Purging
Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 557 (2014).
102 Adam Mossoff & Bhamati Viswanathan, Explaining Efficient Infringement, GEO.
MASON UNIV.: CTR. FOR INTELL. PROP. X INNOVATION POL’Y (May 11, 2017), https://cip2.gmu.
edu/2017/05/11/explaining-efficient-infringement/; Richard A. Epstein & Kayvan B.
Noroozi, Why Incentives for “Patent Holdout” Threaten to Dismantle FRAND, and Why It
Matters, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1381, 1405 (2017).
103 Mossoff & Viswanathan, supra note 102.
104 Id.
105 Id.
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out on its ability to confidently trust in the patent system.106 By
removing a patentee’s exclusive right—the only right that is granted by
a patent—”efficient” infringement eviscerates the reward that is
intended to incentivize invention and innovation. Losing the very
reasons for the patent system is a significant loss in overall social
welfare, not a gain.
Additionally, “efficient” infringement puts a burden that should be
borne by the parties onto the court system. Proponents of “efficient”
infringement counter that it is efficient for someone who wants to make
use of another party’s patented technology if there are differences of
opinion as to whether the patent is infringed or valid, or if the expected
cost of negotiating a license is too high.107 This assessment, however,
fails to realize the burden placed on the judicial system. Congress,
recognizing the burden that patent cases put on both litigants and the
patent system, created a series of post-grant proceedings designed to
allow the validity of issued patents to be challenged outside of the court
system.108 Although there are significant concerns about the execution
of these proceedings, the primary point is that there are savings when
the judicial system is not required to consider all patent disputes.
“Efficient” infringement, on the other hand, takes an activity that should
be happening entirely outside of the legal system—that is, the
negotiation between a patent owner and a party that wants to use the
patent—and forces it into the legal system.
Instead of “efficient” infringement, this type of behavior is more
aptly called predatory infringement. By continuing to refer to this
willful infringement of someone else’s patent rights as “efficient,” it
evokes a sense of increased welfare and productive allocation of
resources, neither of which are true. Predatory infringement provides
a more accurate depiction of what is occurring. The infringer is making
a choice that is his alone and for his sole benefit; the needs and rights of
the prey, or patent owner, are irrelevant to the predator’s calculus.
Of course, changing the term to predatory infringement is only part
of the solution. To curb predatory infringement, it is critical to make
injunctive relief generally available to all patent owners, regardless of
their business model or whether the patent is an SEP. Although eBay
prohibits categorical grants of permanent injunctions in cases of patent
Id.
Sichelman, supra note 101.
108 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011), as
reprinted in 2011 U.S.C.C.A.N. 67, 78; see also id. at 40 (AIA “is designed to establish a
more efficient and streamlined patent system that will improve patent quality and limit
unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”).
106
107
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infringement,109 if these remedies remained a viable option in all cases,
potential infringers would consider predatory infringement much less
attractive most of the time. It is only when the chances of being enjoined
are quite low that predatory infringement becomes practical.
B. Fixing the Patent Troll Narrative
As just explained, the term “efficient” infringement evokes a false
sense of benefit in an otherwise problematic behavior. Similarly, much
of the narrative about patent trolls is either partially or completely
untrue, and yet courts regularly rely on these stories when deciding to
decline injunctive relief to companies that rely on a licensing business
model.110 Specifically, what we hear about patent trolls is that they hide
under bridges, waiting for companies to use their patented technology,
and only then jumping out to sue the accused infringer—depicting a
scene of an unwary traveler being startled.111 Other myths about patent
trolls include both that they do not make anything, but also that they
buy up scads of patents from other companies which they then wield
like swords when setting upon unwary, good folks who are just trying
to put products on shelves.112 Beyond that, the story goes, these patent
trolls are wielding bad, invalid patents, that probably also cover
business methods. The question is whether these stories are real. The
answer is—they are not.
First and foremost, patent trolls are not all the same.113 Despite the
idea that patent trolls exist simply to buy up patents that they then use
like swords, the origin stories and behaviors of patent licensing firms
are quite varied. Some patent licensing firms began as operating
companies that needed to change course in view of industry shifts.114

See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).
See generally Edward Lee, Patent Trolls: Moral Panics, Motions in Limine, and
Patent Reform, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 113 (2015) (describing the etymology of patent
trolls, including the “under the bridge” narratives and explaining how the derogatory
term can have a “moral panic” effect on judges and others).
111 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Patent System: A Reexamination, 76 OHIO
STATE L.J. 467, 559 (2015) (“The widely used term patent ‘troll’ suggests the catching of
people who are unaware that they have committed patent infringement until they are
surprised.”).
112 See, e.g., Network Prot. Scis., LLC v. Fortinet, Inc., No. C 12-01106, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 118105, at *1–4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2013) (opening the opinion with a negative oped about patent trolls buying up unused patents to assert).
113 Osenga, Sticks and Stones, supra note 58, at 1014–16. See generally Christopher A.
Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz, Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs),
99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 650, 659–60 (2014).
114 Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities, supra note 54.
109
110
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Other patent licensing firms are failed startups.115 Still other patent
licensing firms operate as research and development shops.116 And yes,
some patent licensing firms do exist purely to bring nuisance litigation
actions based on questionable patents. But lumping all patent trolls
together and deciding, categorically, that these patent owners are
ineligible for injunctive relief fails to recognize the complexity of the
patent licensing ecosystem. While Justice Kennedy, in his eBay
concurrence, made allowances for special types of patent trolls, like
university researchers or self-made inventors,117 and extraordinary
patent trolls, like CSIRO, have been able to obtain injunctive relief, the
vast majority of patent trolls have been denied injunctions simply
because they license their patents, without any attention being paid to
the specific issues they may face in their circumstances. Treating all
patent trolls as a monolith and reflexively denying injunctive relief is
precisely the opposite of what the eBay case purported to do.
Second, most patent trolls do not stealthily attack unsuspecting
companies.
While there are certainly tales that support the
stereotypical patent troll, the reality is that many infringement cases
where an injunction was denied begin with the story of failed
negotiations between the parties.118 The infringer was not caught
unaware after sinking substantial resources into their product; rather,
the infringer made a calculated decision to not agree to a license that the
patent holder offered. In fact, many courts specifically use a patent
holder’s licensing programs in their eBay analysis to find no irreparable
harm and that money damages are sufficient.119 Even in the eBay case
itself, the patent troll narrative falls apart. eBay was aware both of
MercExchange’s patents and that its technology was covered by these
patents, and eBay and MercExchange attempted to reach a licensing

Cotropia et al., supra note 113, at 669–71.
Id. at 670.
117 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
118 Sannu K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers? An Empirical Analysis of
Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 119–31 (2010) (providing an overview of
relevant literature and competing arguments).
119 See, e.g., BASF Plant Sci., LP, v. CSIRO, No. 2:17-CV-503-HCM, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
228305, at *52–54 (E.D. Va. Dec. 20, 2019) (denying injunctive relief due to failure to
meet the eBay factors because “[t]he fact that Proponents are willing to share with
technology with Opponents counsels against injunction”); Ricoh Co. v. Quanta Comput.,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38220, at *5 (W.D. Wis. Apr. 19, 2010) (denying injunctive relief in
part because of Ricoh’s extensive licensing of its patents to multiple competitors in
Quanta’s industry).
115
116
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agreement, with MercExchange only filing its lawsuit when those
negotiations failed.120
Finally, proponents of “efficient” infringement use “bad” patents
(and particularly business method patents) as a justification for denying
injunctions to patent trolls.121 There is a lot to unpack in this particular
justification. First, the decision whether to grant injunctive relief does
not begin until a patent has been adjudged not invalid and infringed, at
which point it certainly is not a bad (meaning invalid) patent.122 Second,
making a decision to infringe first and pick up the pieces later because
of a belief that a patent could be invalid denies the existence of the
various post-grant proceedings at the Patent Office that allow for easier
and cheaper invalidation of issued patents. Third, the link between
patent trolls, “bad” patents, and business method patents is tenuous at
best.123 Professor Michael Risch has extensively studied the behavior of
patent trolls and found that patents asserted by the most prevalent
patent trolls were related to a variety of technologies, including
communications and computers, mechanical arts, and even a few
chemical patents.124 Only approximately 10 percent of patents that
patent trolls asserted in Risch’s study listed Class 705 (commonly
associated with business methods) as one of their technology classes.125
Even under a broader classification of “high tech” patents that Professor
Colleen Chien proposed, only 40 percent of the patents in Risch’s study
qualify.126 Moreover, Risch’s study found that “traditional patent quality
measures imply at the very least” that patents asserted by patent trolls
are no different than those patents litigated by others, which may
demonstrate that patent trolls are not asserting “bad” patents more
often than any other plaintiffs.127
Correcting these misconceptions about patent trolls would go a
long way towards returning their ability to obtain injunctive relief for
patent infringement. Additionally, thoughtful and rigorous application
120 eBay, 547 U.S. at 392; Brief for Respondent at 1–3, eBay, 547 U.S. at 392 (2006)
(No. 5-130).
121 Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 460–61 (2012).
122 Richard Stroup et al., Patent Holder’s Equitable Remedies in Patent Infringement
Actions Before Federal Courts and the International Trade Commission, 99 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 530, 533 (2017) (“If the patent holder prevails at trial [by showing
the patent not invalid and infringed], the courts can issue a permanent injunction . . . .”).
123 Risch, supra note 121, at 475.
124 Id. at 475.
125 Id. at 476–77.
126 Id. at 477.
127 Id. at 478, 481–83. Risch found these patents faired similar to other patents in
litigation as well. Id. at 481–82.
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of the eBay factors in each case where the plaintiff is a patent licensing
firm should be required—that is, a court should truly examine each of
the factors under the facts of the specific case, rather than relying on the
presumption that patent licensing firms will always be made whole by
money damages. Effects of permitted predatory infringement on a
patent licensing firm’s ability to negotiate with others and opportunity
costs incurred while pursuing predatory infringers should be given
greater weight in these determinations. And, of course, the value of a
strong, reliable patent system to the public’s interest should not be
easily overlooked.
C. Correcting the SEP Owner Story
Just as with patent trolls, the story we often hear about SEP owners
is not entirely true—and yet it is used regularly to justify denying
injunctive relief for infringement of SEPs. Specifically, we hear that SEP
owners use their patents to seek wildly exorbitant licensing terms from
companies who want to make standards-compliant products and that
the SEP owners are wholly unreasonable when it comes to negotiations
about these licenses. Although these two issues are often conflated as
the concept of patent holdup, it is worth considering not just holdup but
also the behaviors surrounding negotiation in these cases. It turns out
that nothing we are being told is exactly what it seems.
Patent holdup is a topic receiving much coverage in the scholarly
literature of late.128 A not-insignificant portion of this research
questions whether patent holdup is an actual problem or just a
theoretical concern (or worse).129 Although, or perhaps because, the
data on this issue are mixed, courts simply accepting patent holdup as a
reason to deny injunctive relief—without examination—is a serious
concern. An interesting example of this is the case of Hynix
Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus.130 After setting forth the eBay factors, the
judge inserted a section in the opinion entitled “Injunctions should not
encourage holdup.”131 Within this section, the judge discussed how
patent holdup and injunctive relief can have a disproportionate cost on
128 A quick search of the LEXIS database for law reviews and journals indicates over
700 articles that mention “patent holdup” since Jan. 1, 2010 and almost 150 articles that
discuss it in significant detail in the same time frame.
129 See generally Sidak, supra note 99; Osenga, Ignorance over Innovation, supra note
84, at 175; Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 102 at 1384; Jonathan M. Barnett, Has the
Academy Led Patent Law Astray?, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1313, 1324–25 (2017); Bowman
Heiden & Nicolas Petit, Patent “Trespass” and the Royalty Gap: Exploring the Nature and
Impact of Patent Holdout, 34 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 179, 181 (2017).
130 Hynix Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 609 F. Supp. 2d 951 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
131 Id. at 966–68.
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the infringer.132 Without referring to this section, the judge then applied
the remaining eBay factors and denied the patent owner injunctive
relief.133 This omission of any discussion of holdup is relevant because
without even determining whether holdup exists (in this case or in
general), the judge made a decision on the requested injunction in the
literal shadow of patent holdup. More recently, the Federal Circuit has
indicated that for a jury to be instructed about patent holdup, there
should be some evidence of it in the record.134 This requirement to
provide evidence of holdup, however, does not keep patent holdup from
being present in a judge’s mind when deciding whether to issue an
injunction against a patent infringer.
Just as the evidence that patent holdup exists is, at best, mixed,
there is also little evidence that SEP owners are behaving in a generally
predatory fashion. Professor Jonathan Barnett has nicely gathered and
synthesized a large amount of the empirical research into allegedly
excessive licensing rates for SEPs, as well as indirect evidence that
would support the claim that these rates are unreasonable and found
that the evidence is simply not there.135 The SEP owner is, most often,
seeking to obtain adequate and fair remuneration for the use of its
patented technology, while the company that wishes to use the
technology would prefer to pay less, rather than more. This practice
does not make the SEP owner a predator, but rather a normal business
owner; if the infringer would like to pay less, that is also prudent. But,
in the case of “efficient” infringement, the infringer would like to pay
nothing; this is where the real predatory behavior is occurring.
There are also two sides to the story that SEP owners refuse to
negotiate fairly with companies who wish to use their patents. The
existence of unwilling licensees, some of whom become predatory
infringers, receives less attention. As noted above, SEP owners often
agree to FRAND commitments as part of the standards development
process; they promise to offer a license to their patents that are
implicated in a technology standard on fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms.136 On the other hand, companies who wish to
practice the standard have made no such promise. Not only have they
not agreed to accept FRAND terms, but they are not even held to a
standard of negotiating in good faith.137 While the United States has
132
133
134
135
136
137

Id. at 967–68
Id. at 986.
Ericsson, Inc. v. D-Link Sys., Inc. 773 F.3d 1201, 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Barnett, supra note 129, at 1352–59.
See supra note 85.
See Epstein & Noroozi, supra note 102, at 1416–18.
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taken a step backwards from considering the behavior of the infringer
when deciding whether to issue injunctions for SEP infringement, other
judicial systems have proactively imposed a “willing licensee”
requirement on would-be predatory infringers and have restored
injunctive relief if the licensee has not upheld its end of the bargain.138
It is important to recognize that, in the world of SEPs, there is the
possibility for unreasonable behavior on both sides. As such, denying—
or worse, prohibiting the seeking of—injunctive relief does not
ameliorate the problem one side causes, but instead exacerbates bad
behavior by encouraging it on the other side. Just like with patent trolls,
if courts would instead carefully apply the eBay factors based on
evidence from the specific case, the problem of predatory infringement
would decrease. Of course, given the FRAND commitment made by SEP
owners, perhaps the issuance of injunctions for infringement of SEPs
would be rare. If, however, the particular circumstances of the case
were scrutinized before making that determination, it would put an
equal burden on potential infringers to engage in good faith negotiations
with SEP owners, which is how it should be.
V. CONCLUSION
Returning to the story that opened this Article, we would not
dream of letting the grocery store pave over my lot without permission,
simply because I was not using that portion of my land or because I had
a pattern of letting other groups or businesses use that portion of my
land. We would not let the grocery store use my lot, free of charge,
because I indicated to the developer that I was open to negotiating an
acceptable price for their use, but the grocery store and I had yet to
arrive at an agreed upon price. The indignation that we feel when the
story involves our personal property, our home, should still be present
when the story is changed to involve a patent instead. Giving the bad
behavior a name that, in its very self, claims the benefit of “efficiency”
does not make it any less offensive. Knowing that its “efficiency” is
based on a set of potentially untrue narratives further delegitimizes it.
We need to be more judicious in choosing to believe the stories we
are being told to justify short-circuiting the eBay factors. We should
demand evidence to support these narratives of the patent troll and the
opportunistic SEP owner. After all, if these stories have always been
true, they should be easy to prove. We should make the “efficient”
infringer demonstrate the net gain in social welfare in a particular case
138 Unwired Planet Int’l Ltd. v. Huawei Techs. Co., [2020] UKSC 37, [61], (appeal taken
from Eng.), aff’g [2018] EWCA (Civ.) 2344 (Eng.); Case C-170/13, Huawei Techs. Co. v.
ZTE Corp., ECLI:EU:C:2015:477, ¶ 71 (July 16, 2015).
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and explain how willful disregard of the patent system does not counter
that net gain. We must require evidence that patent trolls swooped in
to accost the unwary and that this is not just another failed licensing
negotiation scenario. We should, as the Federal Circuit has suggested,
seek proof that the case involves actual patent holdup and, as the
European courts recently have, insist that licensees be similarly held to
a good faith, willing standard to avoid being enjoined. We can make
running to the court to settle private contracting issues less attractive
by ensuring that both sides have some skin in the game; the patent
owner already has its rights at stake anytime the court is involved, but
the infringer should also have some potential loss other than a reduced
royalty rate hanging over its head.
It is important to restore a sense of respect of others’ property in
the patent world. The good news is that no substantial legal changes are
required. We only need to fairly and thoroughly apply the law we were
given in eBay. As the eBay case noted, there should be no categorical
grants of injunctive relief—nor should there be categorical denials.
Although patent trolls and SEP owners currently face near-categorical
denials of injunctive relief, if we pay greater attention to the stories
about these patent owners and require proof, we can return to a place
where injunctive relief is available for all patent owners where
warranted, and predatory infringement can become a thing of the past.

